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We test the trade finance channel of exports by controlling for the bank credit channel.
Using Turkey’s July 2012 adoption of Basel II as a quasi-natural experiment, we examine
whether shocks to trade financing costs affect exports. With data for 16,662 Turkish
exporters shipping 2,888 different products to 158 countries, we find that the share of
letters-of-credit-based exports decreases (increases) when the associated risk weights for
counterparty exposure increase (decrease) after the adoption of Basel II. However, growth of
firm-product-country-level exports remains unaffected. Trade financing might have a lesser
role in exports than previously suggested by the previous literature. (JEL G21, G28, F14)
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A growing body of empirical research shows that shocks to a country’s banks
affect international trade. For example, Amiti and Weinstein (2011) show that
shocks to the financial health of Japanese banks led to a drop in the number
of exports from Japanese firms for which these institutions acted as a main
bank, holding everything else constant (see also Chor and Manova 2012;
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Del Prete and Federico 2014). This body of evidence is consistent with both
an international trade finance channel and a more general bank credit channel.
A number of papers focus on the bank credit channel, while controlling for the
international trade finance channel. For example, Paravisini et al. (2015) show
that the intensive margin of exports drops for Peruvian firms whose local banks
were negatively affected by an international funding shock. We contribute to
this line of research by directly examining the importance of the international
trade finance channel for exports. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the
first to directly identify the trade finance channel of exports, while controlling
for the bank credit channel.
Our identification relies on a shock that specifically affects the cost of a
commonly used international trade financing instrument. Our setting allows us
to compare how exports that relied on this financing instrument ex ante change
after the shock with exports that did not. Moreover, our setup allows us to control
for other possible explanations of changes in exports over the same period.
Importantly, we are able to control for the effects of a bank credit channel. We
find that, controlling for other factors, the share of firm-country-product-level
exports relying on the international trade finance instrument that we consider is
negatively related to the changes in its cost. Interestingly, we find that the same
shock has no effect on the growth of total exports at the firm-country-product
level. As such, our results call into question the relative importance of shocks
to trade-specific finance for international trade and suggest, instead, that a more
general bank credit channel might drive the results observed in the previous
papers.
More specifically, we examine the impact of the adoption of Basel II on
the letters-of-credit-financed exports for a particular country.1 Letters of credit
are standard international trade financing instruments issued by an importer’s
bank.2 The importing firm would then send the instrument to the exporter. The
latter would present the received letter of credit to its local bank, together with
documents needed as proof of export transaction, for payment. Banks that issue
and receive letters of credit have to hold the instrument as an off-balance sheet
item, and doing so creates a capital charge for both institutions.3 For the bank
that holds the letter of credit, the related capital requirement is calculated by
multiplying the nominal value of the instrument by a credit conversion factor
1 These are commercial letters of credit, rather than the standby letters of credit typically used for credit
enhancement.
2 Other main methods of payment in international trade are “cash in advance” (in which the importer bears the
transaction risk by paying the exporter prior to shipment) and “open account” (in which the exporter bears the
transaction risk by getting paid by the importer after the reception of goods).
3 In some countries, for example, the United States, the confirmed letters of credit can be sold in the money market
as bankers’acceptances. In Turkey, however, there is no such secondary market: Once confirmed, letters of credit
have to be held as off-balance items until maturity.
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to obtain the on-balance sheet equivalent and then with a risk weight to adjust
for the issuing bank’s counterparty-risk exposure.4
In this paper, we focus on a country with a particular form of Basel II adoption
that allows us to isolate the impact of the changes in the cost of holding letters of
credit on exports. Turkey’s banking regulators required that all banks operating
in the country move from Basel I to the standardized approach of Basel II as of
July 1, 2012. Under Basel II, for the Turkish exporters’ banks the risk weights,
and hence the cost of holding letters of credit, depend on the agency rating of
the counterparty bank that issues the letter of credit for the importer. In contrast,
under Basel I, the risk weights were based on whether the counterparty bank was
located in a member country of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) or not (i.e., without regard to counterparty risk) with
a preferential treatment for OECD-based counterparties. This intersection of
Basel I and II rules results in two sets of identification schemes. The resultant
changes in the risk weights are expected to impact exports to OECD versus
non-OECD countries differently (more details are provided in Section 1.2).
In testing for the international trade finance channel, our hypothesis is that
increases (decreases) in the costs of holding letters of credit associated with
international trade, due to higher (lower) risk weights after the adoption of
Basel II, will lead to a decrease (increase) in exports, all else being equal.
To test this conjecture, we use difference-in-differences models, estimated
using ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions, where the dependent variable
is the letters-of-credit-based share of exports at the firm-country-product level.
Relying on the share of letters-of-credit-based exports allows us to implicitly
control for demand effects. We take the first-difference of the share of exports
in order to account for the observed differences in pre-Basel-II time trends
across the treatment groups (for which the risk weights change) and the control
groups (for which the risk weights remain the same). This triple-differences
approach allows us to control for confounding factors at the firm-country-
product level so long as they remain constant over two consecutive annual
periods (see, e.g., Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei 2013). We also note that for
any unaccounted variation that could influence our findings, the remaining
confounding factors’ impact would need to be systematic in order to generate
the same effects (with the opposite signs) in two separate samples: OECD and
non-OECD. This is an economically implausible scenario given that our firm-
country-product triplets cover 16,662 exporters, 158 destinations, and 2,888
six-digit Harmonized System (HS6) product categories.
Our findings support the hypothesis described above. For the OECD sample,
our baseline regressions indicate that the share of letters-of-credit-based exports
decrease by 11.80% given the increase in the affected risk-weight category. This
result implies a risk-weight elasticity of letters-of-credit-based share of exports
4 For the letter of credit issuing bank, the related counterparty is the importing firm that requested the instrument.
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of -0.0787 at the firm-country-product level. We find somewhat smaller, yet
comparable, results for the non-OECD sample: The decrease in risk weights
generates a 5.96% increase in export share for the affected rating categories.
These results are robust to changes in the empirical specifications through
additional fixed effects or control variables, different standard errors clustering,
or limiting the sample to specific product categories to better control for
credit conversion factors. A placebo (falsification) test with a fictitious Basel
II adoption date of July 1, 2011, suggests that our results are not due to the
anticipation of the new capital regulation’s implementation.
However, the findings on export shares do not directly answer the question of
whether Basel II adoption negatively affected trade flows as has been suggested
in the financial press and in banking surveys. To test for this possibility, we run
separate export growth regressions. We find no discernable effect: Even though
firm-country-product-level total exports aggregated over all payment types
appear to respond negatively (positively) to the associated risk weight increases
(decreases), the observed effects are not statistically significant. Overall, our
findings imply that the international trade financing channel (as measured by
letters of credit used in international trade) might have a lesser role in exports
than previously envisioned.
1. Identification, Empirical Specifications, and Data
In this section, we detail our identification strategy, empirical specifications, and
data. Our evidence comes fromTurkey, a member of the OECD, theWorldTrade
Organization (WTO), and the Group of Twenty (G-20). Turkey overwhelmingly
exports manufactured goods, making it a large, diversified economy that is
relevant for studying global trade.
As of 2012, the country had the world’s 17th largest economy, was the 22nd
largest exporter by value (15th largest exporter in manufactured goods that we
examine), and was the 14th largest importer.5 Turkey has been in a customs
union for manufactured goods with the European Union (EU) since 1996 and
is the fifth largest exporter to this economic zone (sixth largest in manufactured
goods) and its seventh largest importer.6 Moreover, the manufactured goods
that we examine formed approximately 94% of the total amount of Turkish
goods exported in 2012.
1.1 Identification strategy
The way in which Basel II was implemented in Turkey, when combined
with the availability of detailed exports data, provides us with a particularly
5 Economy size rankings are based on the 2012 estimates of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Trade related
rankings are based on the 2011 estimates of the WTO. These rankings treat the EU as a single economy consisting
of 27 member-country economies.
6 The EU-Turkish customs union does not cover agriculture or the services sector. This said, manufactured goods
include processed food items.
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suitable quasi-natural experiment for examining the international trade finance
channel. Turkish banking regulators required that Basel II be implemented in its
standardized approach by July 1, 2012.7 One consequence is that we do not have
to worry about the identification-related complications that the internal ratings-
based (IRB) approach (in its foundation or advanced version), usually adopted
by large banks, brings. Under the IRB approach, banks’ internal counterparty-
risk assessments, which are proprietary and hence typically not accessible to
researchers, tend to differ across institutions in the capital charges that they
imply for a given on- or off-balance sheet position (see, e.g., Financial Times
2013).8 In contrast, the components of the standardized approach of Basel II
are public knowledge. For us, this means that the same set of identification
schemes applies to all banks operating in Turkey as of July 1, 2012.
The adoption of Basel II rules resulted in changes in the cost of capital,
including capital charges for holding letters of credit, for banks in Turkey.
The latter are off-balance sheet positions, where the cost of capital is
calculated as the notional amount of the letters of credit multiplied by a
credit conversion factor and then a risk weight. When Turkey moved from
Basel I to the standardized approach of Basel II, the letters-of-credit-related
risk weights changed depending on the agency rating of the letter of credit-
issuing counterparty bank’s rating, while the credit conversion factors remained
constant.9 As a result, the costs for Turkish banks to hold these instruments (for
their Turkish exporter clients) were affected with the adoption of Basel II.
The move from Basel I to II generated two sets of risk weight changes
for banks that hold export letters of credit. Under Basel I, for a counterparty
bank located in an OECD-member country, the risk weight is 0.20, while it
is 1.00 for counterparties located in non-OECD countries. In contrast, under
the standardized approach of Basel II, the risk weights differ (regardless of the
country in which the counterparty bank is located) based on (1) the national
regulator-defined groups of agency-rating categories following the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) guidelines and (2) the remaining maturity of the
letters of credit (less than or greater than three months). As described in Table 1,
these changes in risk weights, when combined with the simpler standard under
Basel I, generate testable implications with opposite signs based on whether
Turkish exports are destined for an OECD-member country and depending on
the agency rating of the counterparty bank. Our empirical approach tests for
changes in exports following the increases or decreases in the costs of letters
of credit (given the counterparty institutions’ agency ratings).
7 Starting on January 1, 2014, Turkey adopted Basel III, which is being implemented in stages until 2020.
8 Turkish banking authorities made it clear that the IRB approach eventually would be introduced and asked the
banks in their jurisdiction to develop their own internal models. But, as of July 2013, no Turkish bank was
permitted to use the IRB approach officially.
9 Under Basel I and II, the credit conversion factors can differ by 20%, 50%, or 100% across the types of binding
letters of credit that require a payment. But they remain fixed per letter of credit category during period we study.
See the Internet Appendix Table A1.
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Table 1
Basel I and Basel II risk weights applied to off-balance sheet commercial letters of credit
Risk weights based on long-term agency ratings
Basel I Basel II
Risk weights Risk weights Agency rating categories





Moody’s Fitch or S&P(in case original maturity
short-term ratings >3 months
do not exist)
0.20 0.20 Aaa to Aa3 AAA to AA-
0.50 A1 to Baa3 A+ to BBB-
0.20 1.00 0.50 1.00 Ba1 to B3 BB+ to B-
1.50 1.50 Caa1 and below CCC+ and below
0.20 0.50 Non-rated (NR) Non-rated (NR)
This table presents the Basel I and Basel II risk weights applied to foreign bank liabilities held by the Turkish
banks for a given credit rating, including confirmed export-related commercial letters of credit issued by banking
institutions domiciled in other countries.
Our dependent variable, Trade-credit export share, is defined as the ratio of
letters-of-credit-based exports at the firm-product-country level to total exports
(regardless of financing type) along the same dimensions. By construction,
Trade-credit export share allows us to implicitly account for the country-level
demand for a particular product of a given firm. This approach also accounts
for subtler effects, such as differences in demand due to product quality that
could vary by destination country for a given exporter (e.g., Manova and Zhang
2012).
We hypothesize that, holding everything else constant, Trade-credit export
share would decrease (increase) as the associated letters of credit risk weights
go up (down), compared to the cases in which no such change in risk weights
occurs. The channels behind these hypothesized export share movements
involve pricing and/or credit-exposure limit effects. The first channel would
arise if Turkish banks pass on the higher (lower) cost of capital to their exporter
clients. As the associated risk weight increases (decreases), holding the related
letter of credit would cost more (less) for the bank, compared to cases in which
the risk weights do not change. The second channel would arise if Turkish banks
adopt credit-exposure limits as a simple risk-management tool. For example,
after the change in risk weights instituted by Basel II, a Turkish bank could
decide to have less counterparty bank exposures in the A1 to Baa3 rating
range. Under this scenario, Turkish banks might decide to ration (or ration
to a smaller degree) holding letters of credit issued by such counterparties
given the changes in cost of bank capital. Such counterparty exposure limits
would also affect the letters-of-credit-based export shares. Unfortunately, we
have no way of empirically differentiating between these two not mutually
exclusive channels. We call these two possible mechanisms the “international
trade finance channel.”
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To provide a more concrete description of our identification, suppose that a
Turkish bank receives a request from a Turkish exporter to clear (i.e., hold as an
off-balance sheet item) an export letter of credit of $1 million (approximately
equal to 1.8 million Turkish Liras on July 2, 2012) issued by the importer’s
bank and with a remaining maturity of more than three months. Prior to July 1,
2012, under Basel I, for all counterparty banks located in an OECD-member
country, the related risk weight was 0.20. This would mean that holding this
export letter of credit would have required the Turkish bank to set aside $24,000
in additional capital, regardless of the risk of the counterparty bank issuing the
letter of credit (as depicted in Column 1 of Table 1).10 After July 1, 2012,
under the standardized approach of Basel II, the capital charge for the same
letter of credit would depend on the OECD-based counterparty bank’s agency
rating (Column 4 of Table 1). Suppose that the counterparty bank rating is
between A1 and Baa3 according to Moody’s (A+ to BB- according to S&P or
Fitch) or is nonrated.11 The corresponding risk weight would increase from
0.20 to 0.50. As a result, the capital that the Turkish bank needs to set aside
to hold the letter of credit would go up to $60,000, a 150% increase. Such
transactions form our treatment group: We expect the bank to reflect this
higher cost in its pricing for the service or maybe ration holding such letters
of credit with higher capital charges. Alternatively, the agency rating for the
counterparty bank could be in the Aaa to Aa3 range according to Moody’s
(AAAtoAA- according to S&P or Fitch). Then the capital charge would remain
equal to $24,000 as the associated risk weight would remain equal to 0.20 after
adoption of Basel II. The latter forms the base-case (control) group in our
regressions.
If, instead, the counterparty bank is located in a non-OECD country,
identification would be driven by decreases in risk weight from 1.00 (Column
2 of Table 1) to 0.20 or 0.50 (Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1) as our non-OECD
data are limited to investment grade rating classes. As the cost of holding a
letter of credit from investment-grade counterparty banks decreases, we expect
the related Trade-credit export share to increase.
Because we cannot trace the identities of the issuing banks in the data
available to us, in our testing of the above hypotheses, we proxy the counterparty
bank rating by the country-level (bank total asset weighted) average agency
rating of all banks for which such ratings are available (more details are provided
in Sections 1.2 and 1.3).
10 $24,000 = $1,000,000 × 1.00 × 0.20 × 0.12, where the credit conversion factor is equal to 100% (for a confirmed
export letter of credit), the risk weight is equal to 0.20 (for an OECD counterparty under Basel I), and the minimum
Tier 1+Tier 2 capital ratio is equal to 12% (as required by the Turkish banking regulators).
11 While it might seem initially counterintuitive, the Basel Committee recommends applying the same risk weight
for nonrated bank counterparties as the risk weight for lower investment-grade bank counterparties (see Table 1
for details). This is done to foster imports for low-income countries that would otherwise be at a disadvantage
due to the typically nonrated status of their financial institutions (BIS, October 2011). The Basel Committee also
suggested the removal of the sovereign floor for the same reasons.
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1.2 Empirical specifications
To conduct our analysis, we estimate difference-in-differences models that are
saturated with fixed effects. Our dependent variable is the first-differenced
share of letters-of-credit-based exports. We rely on first-differencing for two
reasons: First, it allows us to absorb any remaining firm-country-product-level
confounding factors, so long as they stay constant over two consecutive annual
periods. Second, and more importantly, as discussed at the end of Section 1.4,
the standard difference-in-differences assumptions regarding the trend of the
dependent variable being the same (on average) for both the treated and control
groups does not hold for the OECD and non-OECD samples. To properly
deal with this problem, we follow Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei (2013) and
estimate the “triple-differences” models: We use three periods of annual data,
which, when first-differenced, allow us to run a difference-in-differences model
with a two-period panel of differenced observations for the same firm-country-
product triplet. The resultant specifications capture the same treatment effect
as a difference-in-differences model in the levels of the dependent variable,
but allow for differences in pretreatment trends for the treated and the control
groups (e.g., Mora and Reggio 2013; Lee 2016).
First, let’s consider the difference-in-differences regression for the OECD
sample, which corresponds to the identification scheme that involves a move
from Column 1 to Column 4 of Table 1:
Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t =β1.Risk-weight increasec ×Basel IIt
+γc,p +γp,t +εf,c,p,t , (1)
where denotes the first-difference operator (such that xt =xt −xt−1); Trade-
credit export sharef,p,c,t is defined as the ratio of letters-of-credit-based exports
for firm f exporting a six-digit Harmonized System (HS6 level) product p
to destination country c in period t with respect to total exports (along the
same dimensions but inclusive of all types of export financing); subscript t ∈
{1,2} denotes annual periods in the two-period panel with first-differenced
dependent variable, where t =1 covers July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012, and
t =2 corresponds to July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013 (t =0, which is implicit in
the first differencing for t =1, covers July 1, 2010 through June 30, 2011); Risk-
weight increasec is an indicator variable equal to one if the risk weight for letters
of credit increase from 0.20 to 0.50 following the adoption of Basel II, and zero
otherwise; Basel II t is equal to one for t =2, and zero otherwise; γc,p and γp,t
denote country × product and product × time fixed effects, respectively; and ε
is the error term of the OLS regression. In Equation (1) (and also in Equations
(2) and (3)), the coefficient estimates for the stand-alone indicator variables
Risk-weight increasec (Risk-weight decreasec) and Basel II t are absorbed into
γc,p and γp,t fixed effects, respectively. Risk-weight increasec tracks the cases
that correspond to the letter of credit-issuer counterparty bank in the destination
OECD country c that have, on average, and throughout our sample, a long-term
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credit rating between A1 to Baa3 according to Moody’s (or equivalently, A+ to
BBB- according to S&P or Fitch) or, alternatively, if none of them are rated. For
these rating categories for the counterparty banks, the associated risk weights
increase by 150%. As a result, the letter of credit channel of trade hypothesis
suggests that β1 is negative. The omitted (i.e., the base case) category comprises
exports for which the risk weight is 0.20 under both Basel I and II; that is, the
base case involves letters of credit issued by counterparty banks with (country-
level) average ratings betweenAaa toAa3 according to Moody’s (AAAthrough
AA- according to S&P or Fitch). The empirical model does not include rating
categories below Baa3. This is because there are no OECD countries with
banks that have an average agency rating equal to Caa1 or worse throughout
the sample period, and only two countries have banks that are consistently rated
Ba1 to B3 (see Section 1.4).12
We estimate a similar model for the non-OECD sample:
Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t =β1.Risk-weight decreasec ×Basel IIt
+γc,p +γp,t +εf,c,p,t , (2)
where Risk-weight decreasec is an indicator variable equal to one if the letter
of credit issuing counterparty banks have, on average, at the country level,
investment-grade (Aaa-Baa3 or equivalently AAA-BBB-) ratings throughout
the sample period, and zero otherwise,13 and the remaining variables are
defined as above. Risk-weight decreasec corresponds to cases in which the
risk weights drop from 1.00 under Basel I to either 0.20 or 0.50 under Basel
II, under the assumption that the letters of credit have, on average, remaining
maturities longer than three months.14 The base case involves Ba1- to B3-rated
counterparties according to Moody’s for which risk weight is constant at 1.0.
The expected sign of the coefficient estimate of interest β1 is now positive:
We expect letters-of-credit-based export shares to go up as the costs of holding
these instruments go down with Basel II.
We could improve on the estimates of Equations (1) and (2) by pooling the
OECD and non-OECD samples. This is because, given the very large number
of fixed effects in our empirical models, combining the two samples allows us
to preserve degrees of freedom, leading to more efficient estimation. We define
12 This effectively constrains OECD regressions to the case for which the remaining maturities of letters of credit
are longer than three months (please refer to Table 1, Columns 1 and 3 versus 4).
13 We combine the Aaa-Aa3 category (for which the risk weight decreases from 1.00 to 0.20) with the A1-Baa3
category (for which the risk weight decreases from 1.00 to 0.50) because the former includes three marginal
destinations for Turkish exports (Hong Kong, Malta, and Singapore) receiving between 0.22% and 0.60% of
Turkish exports. In the Internet Appendix Tables A2 and A5, we provide additional regressions in which these
two categories are accounted for separately.
14 Under the assumption that the letters of credit have, on average, remaining maturities shorter than three months,
Risk-weight decreasec corresponds to cases in which the risk weights drop from 1.00 under Basel I to 0.20 with
Basel II.
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the regression equation for the pooled sample as
Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t =β1.Risk-weight increasec ×Basel IIt
+β2.Risk-weight decreasec ×Basel IIt
+β3.OECDc×Basel IIt +γc,p +γp,t +εf,c,p,t,
(3)
where OECDc is an indicator variable equal to one if the export-destination
is an OECD-member country, and zero otherwise. The OECDc ×Basel IIt
interaction is needed here to capture the post-Basel II differences in the base
cases (with the stand-alone OECDc indicator variable being soaked up by
country × product fixed effects).
While the above specifications (1) through (3) allow us to detect any changes
in the letters-of-credit-based export shares following the adoption of Basel II,
they cannot help us verify whether growth of overall exports was affected. Our
hypotheses would suggest that changes in the costs of letters of credit could
affect aggregate trade flows inclusive of all payment types. And any effect of
Basel II adoption on overall exports would, of course, be more pronounced for
firms with a higher usage of letters of credit before the adoption of Basel II. An
alternative scenario would be the one under which firm-country-product-level
overall exports would not be affected, because exporters would seek and obtain
changes to export settlements by changing payment types (i.e., moving across
letter of credit and non-letter-of-credit payment terms). We test for the effect of
Basel II adoption on overall trade growth by running the following regression
for the OECD sample:




+β3.Basel IIt ×Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t=0
+β4.Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t=0+γc,p,t +εf,c,p,t,
(4)
where ln(Total exportsf,c,p,t ) is the natural logarithm of the value of total exports
of firm f to country c for a given product p; Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t=0
is the period t =0 (i.e., July 1, 2010 through June 30, 2011) share of letter of
credit financed exports for firm f to country c for a given product p; and the
other variables are defined as above. For the non-OECD sample, we define a
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similar growth regression equation:




+β3Basel IIt ×Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t=0
+β4Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t=0+γc,p,t+εf,c,p,t ,
(5)
where all the variables are defined as above. In the next section, we describe
the data used in estimating Equations (1) through (5).
1.3 Data
Our data come from two sources. Firm-country-product-trade-financing-level
export flows data are obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI).15
Counterparty bank rating data are from Bankscope.
For the data needed to construct our dependent variable, Trade-credit export
share, we proceed as follows with the TSI data. Given the Basel II adoption
date of July 1, 2012, first we aggregate the monthly firm-country-product-
trade-financing-level export flows data at the annual level. Each annual period,
represented by t ∈{−1,0,1,2}, is defined from July 1 of year τ to June 30 of
year τ +1 with τ ∈{2009,2010,2011,2012}. In a second step, we construct our
dependent variable as described in the previous section. Annual data based on
periods t = {0,1,2} are used in our main analysis. After we first-difference the
dependent variable, we obtain a two-period panel with which we estimate our
difference-in-difference regressions. Data based on periods t = {−1,0,1} are
used for placebo regressions.
Before proceeding further, we explain the reasoning underlying the above-
described choices. We aggregate monthly export flows into annual ones for the
following reasons. First, we would like to attenuate the problems associated
with zero-trade observations. Our dependent variable is the first-differences
of letters-of-credit-based export share. This variable takes the value of zero
when exporters use a type of financing other than letters of credit. Naturally, if
there are no exports for a firm-country-product triplet in a given annual period,
we cannot calculate the letters-of-credit-based share of exports. Moreover,
given that we first-difference the dependent variable, we require that some
15 These confidential data are accessed through dedicated computers at the TSI offices upon a special request and
after a security clearance: statistics and regression results can only be exported upon approval of the TSI staff.
We underline the fact that the TSI data set has detailed export flows data but it has no export shipments data.
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exports, regardless of the trade financing method involved, be available in all
annual periods for a firm-country-product triplet. With the monthly or quarterly
observations, the requirement to have at least some exports in all periods would
lead to the loss of most of the data at our disposal. Second, we would like to
account for the seasonality of the trade flows. We do not want the interactions
of the ratings range (i.e., risk weights) and Basel II indicator variables to pick
up what could be, in essence, a seasonal variation in exports that arises at the
monthly or quarterly frequency. Seasonality could also induce serial correlation
in the panel, for which one solution is indeed the aggregation of the data at the
annual frequency (e.g., Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).
We combine the above-described TSI exports data with long-term agency
ratings for counterparty banks. To do so, we collect all available ratings by
Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P from the Bankscope database for individual financial
institutions that could be issuing letters of credit for importer-clients of Turkish
exporters.16,17 For many banks, we have overlapping ratings from more than
one of these three agencies. In these cases, we follow the rules imposed by the
Turkish banking regulators:18 If a foreign counterparty bank has two agency
ratings, Turkish banks have to use the lower of the two ratings, and if it has
three ratings, Turkish banks are required to use “the better of the worst two
ratings” (i.e., the middle rating). Since the TSI data do not identify the letter-
of-credit-issuing institutions, we use a proxy for the counterparty-bank rating at
the export-destination-country level. For this, we create a variable by weighting
the observed bank ratings by the latest available total assets, as well as by the
number of days the observed rating is valid for an institution (in case there are
changes to that institution’s ratings over the annual period), for a given country
in a given annual period t . We weight the observed ratings by bank total assets
for the following reasons. Some evidence suggests that a country’s largest banks
predominantly issue letters of credit: Del Prete and Federico (2014) note that
the issuance of trade guarantees (which include letters of credit) is limited to the
top-ten Italian banks, which issue 78% of export- and 74% of import-related
loans, whereas Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017) observe that top-five
U.S. banks account for 92% of all U.S. trade claims (which, in their data, are
mainly letters of credit, but also include other claims such as factoring and
forfaiting). However, it is not clear to what extent Italy and the United States
are representative of other OECD countries, let alone non-OECD countries.
For example, for Turkey (an OECD-member country), bankers that we spoke
16 Alongside Fitch, S&P and Moody’s ratings, the Turkish regulator also allows ratings by JCR and DBRS agencies,
but these institutions’ ratings are not available in the Bankscope database.
17 These include commercial banks, bank holding companies, state-, local government- or privately-owned savings
banks, credit unions, cooperative banks, specialized government credit institutions (which include export-import
banks), Islamic banks, and micro-finance institutions. We exclude the ratings of the following types of institutions:
central banks, supranational entities (e.g., regional development banks), securities firms, investment banks,
investment and trust corporations, and finance companies.
18 As detailed in the BDDK Directive of June 28, 2012, Supplement 1, Section 2, Articles 1.5 and 1.6.
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to indicated that while the largest Turkish banks typically issue letters of credit,
smaller foreign banks are also locally active in this business (most likely thanks
to the comparative advantage conveyed by them being owned by a larger foreign
bank). As a result, our proxy for counterparty-bank ratings allows us to account
for the fact that the largest banks in a country are most likely to be the most
common issuers of letters of credit, without ruling out the possibility that small,
specialized banks operating in the export-destination country also might be
involved in this line of business.
Before moving on to the summary statistics, we acknowledge that our
data set, while very detailed on export flows, has some weaknesses. First,
the TSI data do not contain any information on importers located in export-
destination countries: We cannot directly match exporters to their foreign
importer-partners. That said, to the extent that the importer or group of importers
in a given country to which a Turkish firm exports one particular product stays
constant over two consecutive annual periods, any associated effects would be
differenced-out in our empirical approach. Second, the TSI data do not contain
any information regarding the letters of credit used in Turkish exports apart from
the fact that the associated flows are financed with these instruments.As a result,
we cannot observe the types or the maturities of the related letters of credit.
Different types of letters of credit map into four different credit conversion
factors. However, the latter remain constant under both Basel I and Basel II (see
the Internet Appendix Table A1). As a result, our findings are driven by changes
in risk weights with Basel II, and not credit conversion factors that remain
constant (we nevertheless conduct a robustness check that limits the latter to a
single credit conversion factor category). Third, the TSI data do not include any
information about the Turkish banks that hold the letters of credit. That said,
we can account for Turkish exporters’ bank relations (1) if the composition of
the latter remains constant over two consecutive annual periods (through first-
differencing) or (2) any changes therein would be captured by time-varying
firm fixed effects that we include in some of our specifications. Fourth, our
data do not allow us to observe the identities of the counterparty banks (located
in other countries) that have issued the letters of credit used in Turkish exports.
As a result, we rely on a country-level proxy for the counterparty bank ratings
described above. These limitations, which are imposed on us by the nature
of the TSI data, inevitably put some restrictions on the analyses that we can
conduct. They also point to the importance of saturating our empirical models
with many fixed effects to absorb unobservables that otherwise might have
confounding effects on our tests. In the next section, we present the summary
statistics and discuss the trends of the data.
1.4 Summary statistics
Before going over the summary statistics, we explain a number of restrictions
that we impose on the combined TSI-Bankscope data. First, we limit ourselves
to shipments by the manufacturing sectors, which formed 94% of Turkish
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goods exported in 2012. Second, we exclude firm-country-product-level annual
exports that are below $10,000 to remove small shipments by marginal
exporters that might otherwise influence our export share-based estimates.
Third, to estimate proper difference-in-differences models, we need to ensure
that the confounding factors are appropriately captured by the same set of
constants throughout the estimation period. To accomplish this, and given that
our counterparty-bank rating proxy is at the country level, we require that the
indicator variables Risk-weight increasec or Risk-weight decreasec properly
capture the related firm-country-product-level observations (e.g., within Aaa-
Baa3 or A1-Baa3 rating ranges that correspond to different changes in risk
weight) throughout our sample (see Table 1). As a result, we exclude countries
for which the counterparty-bank rating proxy moves across rating ranges as
defined by Basel II (e.g., fromAaa-Aa3 range toA1-Baa3 for the OECD sample
or between investment and non-investment-grade categories for the non-OECD
sample), something which effectively fixes the credit ratings as of the pre-Basel
II period. Fourth, we exclude a number of countries because they are specific
cases that might otherwise have an undue influence on our results. These include
countries that become OECD-members during our sample period, Cuba, so-
called “Arab Spring countries,” together with Iran and United Arab Emirates.19
After these restrictions, we are left with exports by 9,085 (11,419) firms to 25
(133) OECD (non-OECD) countries in 2,140 (2,661) HS6 product categories.
The data in our final sample correspond to about 56% of Turkey’s manufacturing
exports for the July 2011-June 2013 period by value.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for our dependent variable for the two
annual periods (t =1 and t =2) around the adoption date of July 1, 2012. In
panel A, for the OECD sample, the average share for letters-of-credit-based
exports is equal to 0.0363 and 0.0343 in the pre- and post-Basel II period,
respectively. The observed difference of 0.0030 is statistically different from
zero at the 10% level in a two-sided t-test. For the non-OECD sample, the
average share for letter of credit-based exports is equal to 0.0584 before Basel
II adoption and to 0.0550 after the application of the new rules. The difference
of 0.0034 in the export shares is statistically different from zero at the 1%
19 Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Luxembourg, Pakistan, and Uruguay are excluded because the related weighted-
average bank rating moves across rating-range (risk-weight) categories. Chile, Estonia, Israel, and Slovenia are
excluded because these countries became OECD-members in 2010, during our sample period. Greece is excluded
from the OECD sample because (1) it is the only country with near-default ratings, and (2) during the period
studied, the proxies for its banks’ratings (in terms of total assets-weighted average bank rating), although constant
in mean (near default, with a 1.50 risk-weight category), change dramatically between categories. Hungary and
Portugal are also excluded for a similar reason: (1) both would be the only countries in the “junk” category
with very few observations, (2) although their yearly mean rating puts them in the speculative range (a 100%
risk-weight category), the sovereign ratings worsen dramatically from the A1-Baa3 range according to Moody’s
to speculative grade. Cuba has no rated banks but is the only non-OECD country in sovereign default status
throughout the sample period and a marginal export destination. Arab Spring countries’ imports as well as their
banks’ credit ratings were negatively affected by social unrest and civil wars during our sample period. We drop
Iran because it was subjected to an international embargo, which led to an increase in gold trade with Turkey
to get around sanctions (Dombey 2013). We also eliminate United Arab Emirates because most of the unusual














Summary statistics for the dependent variable
A. Trade-credit export share at the firm-country-product level by annual period
OECD sample Non-OECD sample
7.1.2011 – 6.30.2012 7.1.2012 – 6.30.2013 t-stat 7.1.2011 – 6.30.2012 7.1.2012 – 6.30.2013 t-stat
0.0363 0.0343 1.83* 0.0584 0.0550 2.79***
(0.1633) (0.1614) (0.2147) (0.2101)
[47,183] [47,183] [63,040] [63,040]
B. Trade-credit export share at the firm-country-product level by annual period and by risk-weight changes
that correspond to agency rating ranges
OECD sample Non-OECD sample
(letter of credit maturities >3 months) (letter of credit maturities <3 months)
Risk-weight change Risk-weight change
(Moody’s ratings range) 7.1.2011 – 6.30.2012 7.1.2011 – 6.30.2013 t-stat (Moody’s ratings range) 7.1.2012 – 6.30.2012 7.1.2012 – 6.30.2013 t-stat
Risk-weight unchanged 0.0130 0.0118 0.97 Risk-weight decrease 0.0736 0.0705 1.78 *
at 0.20 (0.1010) (0.0970) from 1.00 to 0.20 or 0.50 (0.2399) (0.2371)
Aaa-Aa3 / AAA-AA-) [13,375] [13,375] (Aaa-Baa3 / AAA-BBB- [39,044] [39,044]
or nonrated)
Risk-weight increase Risk-weight unchanged
from 0.20 to 0.50 0.0455 0.0433 1.61 from 1.00 to 0.50 0.0337 0.0299 2.63 ***
(A1-Baa3 / A+-BBB- (0.1813) (0.1799) (Ba1-B3 / BB+-B-) (0.1629) (0.1532)
or nonrated) [33,808] [33,808] [23,996] [23,996]
Panel A presents the means for Trade-credit export share, the dependent variable, in the annual periods around the Basel II adoption date of July 1, 2012. The standard deviations are within
parentheses, and the number of observations are within brackets. Panel B presents the same statistics by rating categories that correspond to different risk weights, some of which are subject
to change with Basel II’s adoption in Turkey. t-statistics are provided for two-sided tests, which allow for unequal variances, of the equality of the mean of letter-of-credit-based share of
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level in a two-sided t-test. Notably, these means are based on firm-country-
product-level share of exports. In fact, our raw data (based on value of exports)
exhibit patterns similar to those reported in the literature for other countries:
When aggregated over firms-products-destination countries, the (value-based)
fraction of Turkish trade that relies on letters of credit is approximately 5% for
the OECD countries and roughly 15% for the non-OECD countries.20
In fact, our export share data exhibit heterogeneity in many dimensions. One
of these is the difference in the use of letters of credit across counterparty
rating groups that form our “treatment” and control groups (based on the
associated risk-weight categories). In panel B of Table 2, we provide the average
share of letters-of-credit-based exports for counterparty-bank rating ranges
that correspond to categories of risk weights at the heart of our identification
schemes. For the OECD sample, for countries with banks rated between Aaa-
Aa3 on average (and for which the corresponding risk weight stays constant
at 0.20), the average share of exports is 0.0130 in the year prior to adoption of
Basel II and 0.0118 in the year after (the difference of 0.0012 is not statistically
significant in a t-test). For countries with institutions that are, on average,
rated A1-Baa3 or are nonrated (which correspond to our test variable, Risk-
weight increasec, and for which the risk-weight increases from 0.20 to 0.50),
the average share of exports decreases from 0.0455 pre-Basel II to 0.0433 post-
Basel II (the difference of 0.0022 is marginally statistically significant at 11%
in a two-sided t-test that allows for unequal variances). For the non-OECD
sample, we see a larger share of exports based on letters of credit for higher-
rated counterparties. For countries with banks that are investment-grade rated
on average (for which the risk weights drop from 1.00 to 0.20 or 0.50), the
average share of exports is approximately 0.0736 pre-Basel II versus 0.0705
post-Basel II (the difference is statistically significant at the 10% level). A
decrease also can be observed for countries with Ba1-B3 rated counterparty
banks (even though the related risk weight remains unchanged at 1.00) the
average share of letters-of-credit-based exports is equal to 0.0337 pre-Basel
II and 0.0299 post-Basel II (0.0038 difference is statistically significant at the
1% level in a two-sided t-test). While the observed decreases for the non-
OECD sample appear counterintuitive (given that risk weights also decrease),
they are most likely due to confounding factors that are not controlled for in
these univariate statistics. For example, some of the observed patterns could
be due to variations in the exports to different OECD countries by different
20 For example, Ahn (2014) states that letters of credit are involved in 5% of Columbian and 10% Chilean imports
in 2011. Korean International Trade Association data indicate that 15% of South Korean exports involved letters
of credit in 2012 (http://www.kita.net/statistic/index_eng.jsp). Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017) report
that 9.6% of U.S. goods exports (in terms of value) were settled this way. International Credits and Collections
Survey conducted by the Finance, Credit and International Business Association (FCIB) indicates that in 2010,
the exporter-reported country-level use of letter of credit as the main payment method has an average of 10.8%
for a sample of 59 countries (Table 1 in Schmidt-Eisenlohr 2013). Antras and Foley (2015) report that 6% of the
exports of a large U.S. frozen-poultry products producer are letters of credit based.
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Table 3
Additional sample statistics: Industry breakdown
Industry name HS2 code Letters-of-credit-based exports (in %)
July 2011–June 2012 July 2012–June 2013
Textiles 50-63 19.80 19.71
Metals 72-83 17.41 15.98
Machinery / electrical 84-85 16.48 15.52
Transportation 86-89 13.35 12.25
Stone / glass 68-71 9.63 12.79
Plastics / rubbers 39-40 5.84 5.60
Food 16-24 4.79 4.75
Chemicals and allied industries 28-38 4.16 4.29
Mineral products 25-27 2.96 3.19
Miscellaneous 90-97 2.93 3.44
Wood and wood products 44-49 1.57 1.36
Raw hides, skins, leather and furs 41-43 0.65 0.62
Footwear / headgear 64-67 0.42 0.49
This table presents the letters-of-credit-based exports by industry for the two annual periods around the Basel II
adoption date of July 1, 2012. Statistics based on the value of exports at the two-digit Harmonized System (HS2)
industry level.
Figure 1
Pre-“treatment” (Basel II adoption) distribution of share of letters-of-credit-based exports at the firm-
country-product level
Figure 1A plots, for the OECD sample, the frequency distribution of the share of letters-of-credit-based exports
at the firm-country-product level in the annual period preceding the Basel II adoption date of July 1, 2012 (i.e.,
July 1, 2011 – June 30, 2012) and after excluding observations for which the share of exports is zero. Figure 1B
does the same for the non-OECD sample.
industries, some of which might rely on letters of credit more than others (see,
e.g., Table 3).
To get a further understanding of the variation in our dependent variable,
in Figure 1 we provide the frequency distributions for the share of exports
based on letters of credit after excluding the zero shares in the annual period
(t =1) that precedes the adoption of Basel II.21 In Figure 1A for the OECD
sample, slightly more than 4% of the nonzero export share observastions have
21 This exclusion is done to facilitate the reading of the frequency distributions: in the annual period t =1 immediately
preceding the adoption of Basel II, the percentage of observations for which the letter of credit share of exports
is equal to zero is 92.8% for the OECD sample and 91.1% for the non-OECD sample.
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an export share of 100%, suggesting that relatively few firms export a product
to a destination country using letters of credit alone. In fact, for the OECD
countries the frequency of lower use of letters of credit (related share of exports
less than 10%) is more common (ranging from 5% to 10% of the distribution)
than higher use (share of export higher than 90%) of these instruments (ranging
from approximately 2% to 4%). In Figure 1B for the non-OECD sample, the
frequency distribution of nonzero share of letters-of-credit-based exports is
more evenly distributed (between 2% and 5%).
In Table 3 we provide statistics on the heterogeneity of export financing
across industries, albeit at the level of groups of HS2-level industries for the
ease of exposition (given that we have 2,888 HS6-level products in the data).
For example, in the year preceding the adoption of Basel II (i.e., during t =
1), the letter of credit-financed exports account for only 0.42% of exports in
the footwear and 0.65% in the “raw hides, skins, leather and furs” sectors, in
contrast to 16.48% in the machinery industries, 17.41% in metals, and 19.80%
in textiles.
To get a better sense of the heterogeneity observed in the data, in Table 4
we provide more information on the variation of the export patterns per firm,
country, HS6-level product type, and combinations thereof, in the annual period
prior to the adoption of Basel II (i.e., in t =1). For example, in panelAof Table 4,
for letters of credit based exports to OECD countries, the average (median) of
number of exporters per country is 66.3 (39), products per exporter 2.4 (1),
products per country 72.8 (37), exporters per country-product pair 1.9 (1),
products per exporter-country pair 2.0 (1), and export-destination countries per
firm-product pair 1.4 (1). In panel B of the same table, we observe similar
patterns along these dimensions for the non-OECD sample. The statistics
presented in Table 4 underline the importance of controlling for heterogeneity
inherent in the exports data.
The above observed differences in the use of letters of credit for the financing
of international trade are likely to depend on many firm characteristics, some
of which may be directly observable (e.g., industry segment like in Hoefele,
Schmidt-Eisenlohr, and Yu 2016), others adequately proxied by measurable
firm characteristics (e.g., firm size) or simply unobservable (e.g., the bargaining
power of the firm in negotiating with its importers like in Demir and Javorcik
2014). Some of the observed heterogeneity might reflect unobservable qualities
of the exported good (for example, the same manufacturer can ship different
quality versions of the same product to two different destination countries like
in Manova and Zhang 2012). Given the limitations of the data at our disposal,
we do not resort to Heckman-type selection models to adjust for the presence
of unobservable characteristics at various levels, but instead we rely on first-
differences to absorb confounding factors at the firm-country-product level.22
22 Put differently, any Heckman-type firm-level selection correction that would be introduced in our export share
regressions would be differenced-out in our baseline regressions at the firm-country-product level.
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Table 4
Additional sample statistics: Firm, country, and product breakdown
A. OECD sample
Letter-of-credit-financed exports Nonletter of credit financed exports
Total number N Mean Sd Median N Mean SD Median
Firms per country 25 66.28 90.83 39 25 935 924.28 645
Products per firm 996 2.38 3.64 1 8,900 2.47 4.02 1
Products per country 25 72.76 83.22 37 25 526.64 355.17 445
Firms per country-product pair 1,819 1.86 3.05 1 13,166 3.33 7.77 1
Products per firm-country pair 1,657 2.04 2.73 1 23,375 1.87 2.65 1
Countries per firm-product pair 2,371 1.43 1.12 1 21,962 1.99 2.20 1
B. Non-OECD sample
Firms per country 105 32.03 63.97 13 133 214.23 430.44 41
Products per firm 1,746 1.88 2.28 1 11,009 2.93 8.05 1
Products per country 105 36.28 64.05 16 133 169.43 267.73 48
Firms per country-product pair 3,809 1.47 2.30 1 22,534 2.55 4.43 1
Products per firm-country pair 3,363 1.66 1.73 1 28,492 2.02 5.03 1
Countries per firm-product pair 3,286 1.70 2.29 1 32,240 1.78 2.38 1
This table presents statistics on the various dimensions of the data. N is the number of observations. Statistics are
based on data from July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2012, that is, for the annual period prior to the adoption of Basel II.
Next, we focus on the time-trends in our dependent variable across
counterparty rating groups corresponding to risk weights at the core of our
identification strategy. We would like to test the effects of changes in the risk
weights (hence the cost of capital) for letters of credit on the shares of letters-
of-credit-based exports using the difference-in-differences approach based on
the interactions between rating-range and Basel II indicator variables. Such an
approach requires that the basic difference-and-differences assumption holds
in our data: that is, the pretreatment paths of the share of letters-of-credit-based
exports should be similar across rating-range group for which the risk weights
change (the treated group) with Basel II compared to that for which they remain
the same (the control group). To examine whether this is the case, first we plot
the average share of letter of credit based exports (at the firm-country-product
level) for counterparty rating ranges that correspond to risk weights listed in
Table 1. Figure 2 shows, and additional tests confirm (see Internet Appendix
Table A6), that the basic difference-in-differences assumptions are unlikely to
prevail in either of the two samples (OECD and non-OECD) that we use. There
are pre-Basel II differences not only in the levels of share of exports (which
would be absorbed by the related rating-range indicator variables), but more
importantly, in the trends of share of letters-of-credit-based exports between
the treated groups and control groups.23 These observations suggest that our
23 The observed differences in time-trends may arise, at least in part, due to the fact that Turkish banks were asked
to conduct Basel II Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) by the Turkish regulators, as suggested by the Basel
Committee (e.g., BDDK Report, July 2007). These QIS would have drawn the banks’ attention to various costs
associated with the adoption of Basel II: Banks might have started to implement some, if not most, of the policy
changes triggered by Basel II earlier than the adoption date of July 1, 2012, potentially generating changes in
time trends. We test for this possibility by conducting placebo regressions as part of our robustness checks in
Section 3.
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Figure 2
Pre- and post-“treatment” trends in letters-of-credit-based share of exports at the firm-country-product
level
Figures 2A and 2B plot, for different annual periods, pre- and post-“treatment” (Basel II adoption) trends in
letters-of-credit-based share of exports at the firm-country-product level for ranges of counterparty bank ratings
that correspond to risk-weight categories defined by Basel II (and depicted in Table 1). Pre-Basel II annual periods
correspond to t =0 (July 1, 2010-June 30, 2011) and t =1 (July 1, 2011-June 30, 2012), whereas post-Basel II
period is t =2 (July 1, 2012-June 30, 2013). Figure 2A corresponds to the OECD sample used in the estimation
of Equation (1). Figure 2B corresponds to the non-OECD sample used in the estimation of Equation (2).
empirical approach has to take into account the differences in the time trends
across the treatment and control groups for the letters-of-credit-based share
of exports. We do so by following Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei (2013) and
implement difference-in-differences with the first-differenced (rather than the
level of) share of exports, as detailed in Section 1.2.24
2. Main Results
Before discussing the results, we note that the regression equations, which are
estimated with OLS regressions, involve country × time clustered standard
errors. This is because our key variation of interest (the interaction of the
Basel II indicator variable with the indicator variable that traces the country-
level average credit quality of the counterparty bank) is at the country-time
level. We have 25 OECD and 133 non-OECD export-destination countries and
24 Consistent with the Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei (2013) approach, we observe no difference between the treated
groups and control groups when we rerun the cross-sectional regressions with double-differenced data (see the
even-numbered columns of the Internet Appendix Table A6).
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two periods (after first-differencing the data). In this setting, the number of
truly independent clusters of data in each period of our two-period panel is 50
for the OECD and 266 for the non-OECD sample: firm-product pairs in the
same country-year will face correlated shocks from common country-specific
business cycles (e.g., Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).
2.1 Estimates for the sample of OECD countries
First, we focus on the OECD sample, which is limited to exports to countries that
are members of this organization throughout the sample period and whose banks
have weighted average ratings that are either investment grade or nonrated given
the imposed data restrictions.25
Table 5 presents the findings. The results for Equation (1), our baseline
regression, are presented in Column 1 of Table 5. The estimate of the coefficient
of interest β1 for the interaction Risk-weight increasec × Basel II t is equal to
−0.00537 (i.e., −0.537 percentage points), which is statistically significant
at the 1% level. This is an economically significant effect, given that, in
Table 2, the pre-Basel II share of letters-of-credit-based exports related with
OECD counterparty banks for which the increase in risk weight is equal
to 0.0455 (i.e., 4.55 percentage points), on average. Our finding indicates
that the share of exports decreases by −11.80% (=−0.00537/0.0455) as
the risk-weight increases with Basel II from 0.20 to 0.50 for countries with
banks that are rated A1 to Baa3, on average. This suggests that the risk-
weight elasticity of letters-of-credit-based share of exports is equal to −0.0787
(=[−0.00537/0.0455]/[(0.50−0.20)/0.20]) at the firm-country-product level
as the risk weights increase 150%. In other words, for the OECD sample, a
10% increase in risk weight leads to an approximately 0.8% decrease in the
letters-of-credit-based export shares for firms.
First-difference of the share of letters-of-credit-based exports takes out any
confounding effects that are at the firm-country-product level so long as such
effects remain constant between annual periods t =0 and 1 or between t =1
and 2. Moreover, we saturate the baseline model with country × product and
product × time fixed effects (all at the HS6 product-code level) that would
account for other potential confounding factors (such as country-level demand
for a particular Turkish export product, or aggregate demand for a particular
product over time). Nevertheless, this approach might not remove general Basel
II effects that could affect some or all exporters in t =2. Such effects could
arise, for example, because higher risk-based capital standards may lead to less
lending to all or some borrowers (e.g., small- and medium-sized enterprises):
firms typically rely on bank credit for working capital, on which exports heavily
25 This means that we can only conduct tests with the assumption that the letters of credit have a remaining maturity
of more than three months, because OECD countries with banks that have, on average, below investment-grade
ratings drop out of our sample due to the implemented data constraints. Moreover, the only OECD member
country with unrated banks in Bankscope is Iceland.
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Baseline firm × time firm × product × time
regression fixed effects fixed effects
1 2 3
Risk-weight increasec × Basel II t −0.00537*** −0.00588*** −0.00592***
(−4.85) (−3.80) (−3.79)
Number of observations 94,366 94,366 94,366
Regression R2 0.147 0.343 0.359
Fixed effects Country × product, Country × product, Country × product,
product × time product × time, firm × productHS2 × time
firm × time
Clustered standard errors Country × time Country × time Country × time
This table presents the estimates of regression:
Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t =β1.Risk weight increasec ×Basel IIt +γc,p +γp,t +εf,c,p,t
in which  is the first-difference operator (i.e., xt =xt −xt−1); Trade-credit export sharef,c,p.t is the share of
letters-of-credit-based exports for firm f exporting product p to export-destination country c in period t with
respect to total exports along the same dimension during t ; subscript t , with t ∈{1,2}, denotes annual periods
in the two-period panel with first-differenced dependent variable, where t =1 covers July 1, 2011 through June
30, 2012, t =2 corresponds to July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013 (i.e., the year that follows Basel II adoption
date of July 1, 2012; t =0, which is implicit in the first differencing, covers July 1, 2010 through June 30, 2011);
Risk-weight increasec is an indicator variable equal to one if the letter of credit-issuer counterparty-banks in
the destination OECD country c have, on average, a long-term credit rating between A1 to Baa3 according to
Moody’s (or equivalently rated A+ to BBB- by S&P or Fitch) or are nonrated, and for which the letter of credit-
associated risk weights increase from 0.20 to 0.50 following the adoption of Basel II, or zero otherwise; Basel II t
is an indicator variable equal to one for t =2, and zero otherwise; γc,p denotes country × product fixed effects,
and γp,t denotes product × time fixed effects; and ε is the error term of the OLS regression. All product fixed
effects are at the six-digit Harmonized System (HS6) level, with the exception of the firm-productHS2-time fixed
effects in Column 3, which are at the two-digit Harmonized System level. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the country × time level, and the corresponding t-statistics are provided within parentheses below the coefficient
estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
depend because payment cycles are longer in international trade compared
to domestic trade (Beaumont 2016). Less bank lending after Basel II, when
combined with risk-weight changes, might affect the composition of exports
depending on their types of trade financing. It also could be that there are more
changes to bank-exporter relations in Turkey around Basel II. To account for
these and other plausible indirect Basel II effects, we re-estimate Equation
(1) after adding time-varying firm fixed effects to our baseline regression: in
Column 2 of Table 5, the coefficient estimate for Risk-weight increasec ×
Basel II t is equal to −0.00588, which is statistically significant at the 1% level.
This suggests that the letters-of-credit-based export share decreases by 12.92%
(=−0.00588/0.0455 ), with an associated elasticity of share of letters-of-credit-
based exports to changes in risk weights equal to −0.0862 (=−0.1295/1.50).
These results, which are very similar to the ones based on the β1 estimate
of Column 1 of the same table, show that the change in the share of exports
using letters of credit is a within-firm phenomenon. Importantly, the bank credit
channel, which is implicitly controlled for through firm × time fixed effects,
cannot explain out results: Our specification in Column 2 of Table 5 is able
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to identify the international trade channel as any indirect Basel II effects are
accounted for by the time-varying firm fixed-effects. We conclude that for the
OECD sample, any indirect Basel II effects do not materially influence our
results.
Next, we estimate Equation (1) with better controls for time-varying firm-
product confounding factors (such as time-varying demand for individual firms’
products). To do so, we replace the combination of product × time and firm ×
time fixed effects of Column 2 with the firm × product × time fixed effects,
with the product categories defined at the HS2 level.26 The coefficient estimate
for the interaction Risk-weight increasec × Basel II t is not materially affected
by the addition of triple-interaction fixed effects: In Table 5, Column 3, the
estimate for β1 is equal to −0.00592 and statistically significant at the 1%
level, a result similar in magnitude to those of Columns 1 and 2 of the same
table. We conclude that, for the OECD sample, the increases in the costs of
letters of credit have led to a decrease in the share of letter of credit financed
exports.
2.2 Estimates for the sample of non-OECD countries
In Table 6, we present estimates of Equation (2). In Column 1, the coefficient
estimate for the interaction Risk-weight decreasec×Basel II t is equal to 0.00439
and statistically significant at the 5% level. The observed impact of risk-
weight change is not trivial economically: It amounts to a 5.96% increase
in export share, which, prior to the adoption of Basel II, is equal to 7.36%
for investment-grade plus nonrated non-OECD countries. These results are not
materially affected when we account for general Basel II or finer time-varying
firm-product demand. In Column 2 of Table 6, the coefficient estimate for
Risk-weight decreasec × Basel II t with firm × time fixed effects is equal to
0.00497 and statistically significant at the 5% level. In Column 3 of Table 6,
the coefficient estimate for Risk-weight decreasec × Basel II t with firm ×
(HS2 level) product × time fixed effects, is equal to 0.00482 and statistically
significant at the 10% level.
With the non-OECD sample, we also estimate a version of Equation (2)
in which Risk-weight decreasec is split into two: 80% Risk-weight decreasec
corresponds to the counterparty bank rating range of Aaa to Aa3 (for which
the risk weight decreases from 1.00 to 0.20) and 50% Risk-weight decreasec
for counterparty bank ratings between A1 and Baa3, as well as nonrated cases
(for which the risk weight decreases from 1.00 to 0.50). Internet Appendix
Table A2 presents the related results. The coefficient estimates for 80% Risk-
weight decreasec × Basel II interactions are never statistically significant,
26 In this specification country × product fixed effects are still defined at the HS6-level. For firm × product × time
fixed effects, we limit ourselves to the HS2-level product categories because at the HS6-level the total number
of fixed effects (i.e., country × product and firm × product × time all combined together) would have amounted
to 63% of OECD observations and 73% of the non-OECD observations.
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Baseline firm × time firm × product × time
regression fixed effects fixed effects
1 2 3
Risk-weight decreasec × Basel II t 0.00439** 0.00497** 0.00482*
(2.49) (2.04) (1.67)
Number of observations 126,080 126,080 126,080
Regression R2 0.209 0.406 0.437
Fixed effects Country × product, Country × product, Country × product,
product × time product × time, firm × productHS2 × time
firm × time
Clustered standard errors Country × time Country × time Country × time
This table presents the estimates of regression:
Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t =β1.Risk-weight decreasec ×Basel IIt +γc,p +γp,t +εf,c,p,t
in which  is the first-difference operator (i.e., xt =xt −xt−1); Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t is the share of
letters-of-credit-based exports for firm f exporting product p to export-destination country c in period t with
respect to total exports of f in p to c during t ; subscript t , with t ∈{1,2}, denotes annual periods in the two-period
panel with first-differenced dependent variable; t =1 covers July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012; t =2 corresponds
to July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013, i.e., the year that follows Basel II adoption date of July 1, 2012 (t =0,
which is implicit in the first differencing, covers July 1, 2010 through June 30, 2011); Risk-weight decreasec is
an indicator variable equal to one if the letter of credit-issuing counterparty-banks in the destination non-OECD
country c are, on average, rated between Aaa and Baa3 from Moody’s (or equivalently rated AAA to BBB- by
S&P or Fitch) throughout the sample period and for which group the letter of credit risk-weight decrease from
1.00 to 0.20 with Basel II, or zero otherwise; Basel II t is equal to one for t =2, and zero otherwise; γc,p denotes
country × product fixed effects, and γp,t denotes product × time fixed effects; and ε is the error term of the
OLS regression. All product fixed effects are at the six-digit Harmonized System (HS6) level, with the exception
of the triple firm × productHS2× time fixed effects in Column 3, which are at the HS2 level. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the country × time level, and the corresponding t-statistics are provided within parentheses
below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
which might be due to the fact that the corresponding group of countries,
whose banks are, on average, rated Aaa through Aa3, include three marginal
destination countries for Turkish exports (Hong Kong, Malta, and Singapore).27
In contrast, in Column 1 of the Internet Appendix Table A2 the coefficient
estimate for the interaction 50% Risk-weight decreasec × Basel II is equal
to 0.00447, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Similar results
are obtained in the other two columns under the different fixed effects
combinations.
The non-OECD sample results corroborate those of the OECD sample even
though Basel II related shock, a decrease in risk weights, is in the opposite
direction: Reductions in the cost of letter of credit financing have led to increases
in letter of credit financed export shares. In the next section, we present the
estimates of Equation (3) using a pooled OECD and non-OECD sample with
a view to improve estimation efficiency.
27 In 2012, Malta received 0.60% of Turkey’s total exports (by value), Singapore 0.29%, and Hong Kong 0.22%.
3993
[13:20 3/10/2017 RFS-hhx062.tex] Page: 3994 3970–4002
The Review of Financial Studies / v 30 n 11 2017
Table 7
Pooled (OECD plus non-OECD) sample regressions
Additional Additional
Baseline firm × time firm × product × time
regression fixed effects fixed effects
1 2 3
Risk-weight increasec × Basel II t −0.00512*** −0.00407* −0.00448***
(−4.21) (−1.93) (−2.59)
Risk-weight decreasec × Basel II t 0.00457** 0.00551** 0.00539**
(2.55) (2.36) (2.05)
OECDc × Basel II t 0.00771*** 0.0114*** 0.0121***
(4.37) (4.24) (4.44)
Number of observations 220,446 220,446 220,446
Regression R2 0.176 0.334 0.364
Fixed effects Country × product, Country × product, Country × product,
product × time product × time, firm × productHS2 × time
firm × time
Clustered standard errors Country × time Country × time Country × time
H0: Risk-weight increasec × Basel II t = 18.89*** 10.34*** 10.92***
Risk-weight decreasec × Basel II t
H0: |Risk-weight increasec × Basel II t | = 0.0678 0.189 0.0761
| Risk-weight decreasec × Basel II t |
This table presents the estimates of regression equation:
Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t =β1.Risk-weight increasec ×Basel IIt +β2.Risk-weight decreasec
×Basel IIt +β3.OECDc ×Basel IIt +γc,p +γp,t +εf,c,p,t
in which  is the first-difference operator (i.e., xt =xt −xt−1); Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t is the share of
letters-of-credit-based exports for firm f exporting product p to export-destination country c in period t with
respect to total exports of f in p to c during t ; subscript t denotes annual periods in the two-period panel of first-
differenced dependent variable with t ∈{1,2} (t =1 covers July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012; t =2 corresponds to
July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013; t =0, which is implicit in the first-differencing, covers July 1, 2010 through
June 30, 2011); Risk-weight increasec (Risk-weight decreasec) is equal to one if the risk weights for letters
of credit increase (decrease) following the adoption of Basel II (increases correspond to OECD countries and
decreases to non-OECD countries); OECDc is equal to one if country c is an OECD-member throughout the
sample period; γc,p denotes country × product fixed effects, and γp,t denotes product × time fixed effects; and
ε is the error term of the OLS regression. All product fixed effects are at the six-digit Harmonized System (HS6)
level, with the exception of the triple firm × productHS2 × time fixed effects in Column 3, which are at the
HS2 level. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country × time level, and the corresponding t-statistics are
provided within parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
2.3 Estimates for the pooled (OECD plus non-OECD) sample
We estimate Equation (3) under the assumption that the letters of credit have
longer than three months of maturity, on average.28 In Column 1 of Table 7, the
coefficient estimate for Risk-weight increasec × Basel II t , which corresponds
to the A1-Baa3 and nonrated counterparties located in OECD countries (as
traced by our country-level proxy) subjected to an increase in risk weights
(from 0.20 to 0.50), is equal to −0.00512, which is statistically significant at
28 Estimating Equation (3) under the assumption that the letters of credit have shorter than three months of
remaining maturity would amount to estimating only the Risk-weight decreasec × Basel II t interaction but
with a larger sample: in this case Risk-weight increasec× Basel II t interaction cannot be estimated since there
is no corresponding change in the risk weights in this case (given that we have no OECD country in our sample
with banks that are rated below investment grade, on average; see also Table 1).
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the 1% level. This estimate is similar to the coefficient estimate of −0.00537
in Column 1 of Table 5. In Column 1 of Table 7, the coefficient estimate for
Risk-weight decreasec × Basel II t , which corresponds to the investment-grade
and nonrated non-OECD-based counterparty banks for which the risk weights
decrease, is equal 0.00457 and statistically significant at the 5% level. Again,
this estimate is similar to the estimate of 0.00447 for the Risk-weight decreasec
× Basel II t interaction in Column 1 of Table 6.
The pooled sample regression gives us the possibility to test for the equality
the coefficient estimates of Risk-weight increasec × Basel II tand Risk-weight
decreasec × Basel II t . These tests are provided at the bottom of Column 1 in
Table 7. We reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimate of −0.00512
for Risk-weight increasec × Basel II tequals the coefficient estimate of 0.00457
for Risk-weight decreasec × Basel II t : The Wald test statistic is equal to 18.89,
which statistically significant at the 1% level. In a second step, we test whether
the observed effect is symmetric. That is, we test for the equality of the absolute
values of the observed coefficient estimates: the test statistic is equal to 0.0678,
which is not statistically significant. So the effect Basel II adoption on letter of
credit based exports appears to be of similar magnitudes even if it is of different
directions for the risk-weight increases versus decreases.
We have similar estimates for the interactions of interest in Column 2 (with
the addition of firm × time fixed effects to Equation (3)) and Column 3 (with
the addition of and firm × (HS2 level) product × time fixed effects) of Table 7.
Overall, the pooled sample estimates are line with our estimates using separate
OECD and non-OECD samples.
However, these findings do not clarify the actual impact, if any, of Basel II
related risk-weight changes on total trade at the firm-product-country level. We
examine this question next.
2.4 Trade growth regressions
In Table 8, we present the estimates of trade growth regressions for the OECD
and non-OECD samples, respectively, in which we test whether Basel II actually
affected total trade (aggregated over all payment terms) at the firm-country-
product level. In Column 1 of Table 8, we present the estimates of Equation
(4) for the OECD total trade growth. In this case, we are interested in the
triple interaction of Risk-weight increasec × Basel II t × Trade-credit export
sharef,c,p,t=0 for which the coefficient estimate is equal to -0.0557 but is
not statistically significant. Despite having the correct negative sign, our test
indicates that, for higher letter of credit export share in the pre-Basel II period,
the risk-weight increases brought about by Basel II did not affect total firm-
country-product level exports to destinations whose banks are, on average,
A1-Baa3 rated.
In Table 8, Column 2, we find similar results for the non-OECD sample.
Here our test relies on the triple interaction of Risk-weight decreasec × Basel
II t × Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t=0, for which the coefficient estimates are
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Table 8
Firm-destination-product-level trade growth regressions
OECD sample Non-OECD sample
1 2
Risk-weight increasec × Basel II t × Trade-credit export −0.0557
sharef,c,p,t=0 (−0.30)
Risk-weight decreasec × Basel II t × Trade-credit export 0.0749
sharef,c,p,t=0 (0.44)
Risk-weight increasec × Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t=0 0.00471
(0.03)
Risk-weight decreasec × Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t=0 −0.0212
(−0.15)
Basel II t × Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t=0 0.383∗∗ 0.233∗
(2.57) (1.94)
Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t=0 −0.350∗∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗
(−3.02) (−2.98)
Number of observations 94,366 126,080
Regression R2 0.315 0.436
Fixed effects Country × product × time Country × product× time
Clustered standard errors Country × time Country × time
Column 1 (Column 2) presents the estimates of regression equation for the OECD (non-OECD) sample (where
Risk-weight decreasec replaces Risk-weight increasec):
ln(Total exportsf,c,p,t )=β1.Risk-weight increasec ×Basel IIt ×Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t=0
+β2.Risk-weight increasec ×Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t=0
+β3.Basel IIt ×Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t=0
+β4.Trade-credit export sharef,c,p,t=0 +γc,p,t +εf,c,p,t
in which  is the first-difference operator (i.e., xt =xt −xt−1) with t ∈{1,2}, denotes annual periods in the
two-period panel (t =1 covers July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012; t =2 corresponds to July 1, 2012 through June
30, 2013); ln(Total exportsf,c,p,t ) is the natural logarithm of the value of total exports (with all types of export
financing combined) of firm f to country c for a given product p in period t; Risk-weight increasec is an indicator
variable equal to one if the letter of credit-issuer counterparty-banks in the destination OECD country c have, on
average, a long-term credit rating between A1 to Baa3 according to Moody’s (or equivalently rated A+ to BBB-
by S&P or Fitch) or are non-rated, and for which the letter of credit-associated risk weights increase from 0.20 to
0.50 following the adoption of Basel II, or zero otherwise; Risk-weight decreasec is an indicator variable equal
to one if the letter of credit-issuing counterparty-banks in the destination non-OECD country c are, on average,
rated between Aaa and Baa3 from Moody’s (or equivalently rated AAA to BBB- by S&P or Fitch) throughout
the sample period and for which group the letter of credit risk-weight decrease from 1.00 to 0.20 with Basel
II, or zero otherwise; Basel II t is equal to one for t =2 post Basel II, and zero otherwise; Trade-credit export
sharef,c,p,t=0 is the share of letters-of-credit-based exports for firm f exporting product p to export-destination
country c in period t =0 (which covers July 1, 2010 through June 30, 2011) with respect to total exports of f
in p to c during the same period; γc,p,t denotes country × product × time fixed effects; and ε is the error term
of the OLS regression. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country × time level, and the corresponding
t-statistics are provided within parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
0.0749, which is not statistically significant. While the coefficient estimate of
interest has the anticipated positive sign (i.e., the drop in the risk weights is
associated with positive total trade growth for flows with high letters-of-credit-
based export shares in the pre-Basel II), it is not statistically significant.
2.5 Discussion
The failure to find a statistically significant result for the total export growth
using neither the OECD nor the non-OECD sample suggests that Basel II
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did not affect trade at the firm-product-country level when all payment types
are combined. This is despite the fact that the share of letters-of-credit-based
exports is affected as suggested by the trade credit channel of exports. The lack
of statistically significant results for the growth regressions suggests that trade
finance channel is not important for exports. Instead, the growth regression
findings are consistent with accommodation through payment terms following
adoption of Basel II. That is, as risk weights changed with Basel II, Turkish
exporters appear to have accommodated the resultant changes in the costs of
letter of credit by switching to other payment terms for international finance.
One could view such behavior as a form of regulatory arbitrage.29
There are several possible explanations for the lack of support for the trade
finance channel. First, at the time of our quasi-natural experiment, the Turkish
banks were well capitalized: Adopting Basel II has led to a 1.5% decrease in
their risk-based capital ratios, leaving the banking sector capitalized at roughly
15%. This is important, because the trade finance channel may become more
significant during crises when firms are less likely to have access to trade credit
extended by their trade partners or they face increased nonpayment risk for
their export sales. For example, Antras and Foley (2015) and Paravisini et al.
(2015) find little substitution between the methods of payment at the time of
the Great Recession of 2008–2009. Second, it could be that the bank credit
channel, which our firm × time fixed effects implicitly control for, might be
more important than the trade finance channel. A shock to the availability of
short-term bank credit could affect export performance because it could lead to
working capital shortages. Payment terms are longer in international finance.
As a result, the role of working capital becomes even more important than the
role it plays in domestic trade (Beaumont 2016).
Our contribution in this paper is to make use of Basel II’s adoption in Turkey
to clearly identify the trade-finance channel while controlling for the more
general bank credit channel. Earlier papers could not or did not differentiate
between the trade finance channel and the bank credit channel (e.g., Amiti
and Weinstein 2011; Chor and Manova 2012). Other papers have focused on
the bank credit channel. For example, in Paravisini et al. (2015), who do not
observe trade finance instruments directly but make use of exogenous shocks
to the general level of company-level bank funding, the bulk of the bank-shock
lending effect points to the working capital channel at play. In their case, export
sensitivity does not depend on variables measuring typically export-specific
finance needs. Moreover, the contribution of noncredit factors to the fall in
Peruvian exports during the Great Recession was larger than that of credit-
related factors. As another example, Del Prete and Federico (2014), who use
detailed Italian data on bank-firm loan types, observe an effect of bank shocks
29 For examples of regulatory arbitrage by banks, see for example, Boyson, Fahlenbrach, and Stulz (2016),
Demyanyk and Loutskina (2016), and Yorulmazer (2012).
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on general level of firm exports. Yet they find that only the provision of general
loans, but not trade-related lending, matters.30
Our findings are also in line with those of Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010)
and Eaton et al. (2016), who note that the bulk of the decrease in international
trade during the Great Recession could be attributed to a fall in durable goods’
trade (probably linked with a fall in demand for such goods) rather than a
pure finance-channel effect. The observed comovement in the demand and
trade financing in various empirical studies of global exports in durable goods
industries, such as metals, machinery, or transportation, may be due to the fact
that these are also more trade-finance intensive (e.g., see Table 3).
Our results also have important policy implications. Many institutions
involved in global trade raise serious concerns regarding the treatment of
financial instruments related with international trade under later versions of
risk-based capital requirements proposed by the Basel Committee on Bank
Regulation. For example, in 2009 Robert Zoellick, the then-president of the
World Bank, suggested that 10%–15% of the decrease in global trade during
the Great Recession might be due to lower provision of trade finance under
Basel II (Financial Times 2009).31 A 2009 survey by the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC) reports that “the feedback ... on Basel II ... [suggests] that
most banks are facing tougher capital requirements for their [international]
trade assets” (ICC 2009, 40). Other banking surveys indicate that (1) Basel
II had a negative impact on banks’ provision of trade finance for most large
international financial institutions and that (2) for a nonnegligible proportion
of banks the increase in the cost of trade finance products is linked with higher
capital requirements (Asmundson et al. 2011). Our findings suggest that these
worries appear to be overstated. While Basel II related changes in the treatment
of letters of credit have an impact on the export shares financed with these
instruments, we cannot find any impact on total trade growth. Parties involved
in international trade appear to be able to accommodate the changes to the costs
of letters of credit financing.
3. Robustness Checks
As a first check, we redefine Trade-credit export share with respect to the
average of total exports over two consecutive periods and estimate the so-
called “midpoint regressions” (e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger 1992, 1998) to rule
30 Some other studies that do not use direct bank- or firm- data point in the same direction. For example, Behrens,
Corcos, and Mion (2013) find that while exports of Belgian firms with shorter maturity of debt or a larger fraction of
financial debt shrank more during the Great Recession, their exports-to-turnover ratio (that is, including domestic
sales) did not, going against the trade-finance channel story.
31 Similar fears have been raised for Basel III, which initially proposed that a 100% capital earmark be set aside
for many off-balance sheet items, including letters of credit (see, for example, Masters 2010; Evans 2011). Upon
consultations with the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the ICC, the BIS relaxed certain
aspects of capital requirements for international trade instruments under Basel II and III (Masters 2011; BIS,
October 2011).
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out the influence of zero trade shares. The results in the first columns of the
Internet Appendix Tables A3 through A5, confirm our main findings.32
Second, we test whether our results could be due to unaccounted demand
factors. To do so, we add Importsc,t (the global imports, from the IMF DOTS
database, excluding Turkish exports, of country c in annual period t) and
Sovereign ratingc,t (the change in sovereign rating for country c during period
t) to our specification. Results in the second columns of the Internet Appendix
Tables A3 through A5 suggest that adding these two variables does not affect
our results. In Column 3 of the same tables, our coefficient estimates of interest
remain unaffected with country-specific time trends.
Third, to rule out that our results could be driven by possible shifts across
credit conversion factors, we limit our sample to the particular case of metals.
This group of products is composed of standardized manufactured goods (such
as sheet or rod iron and steel) that can be easily collateralized, in which case the
credit-conversion factor is equal to 20%. In Column 4 of the Internet Appendix
Tables A3–A5, our results remain the same when the credit conversion factor
is highly likely to stay constant at 20%.
Fourth, we conduct a placebo test by using the fictitious Basel II adoption
date of July 1, 2011, using the July 2009-June 2012 sample. In the last columns
of the Internet Appendix Tables A3–A5, we find no statistically significant
effects that could be due to banks’ anticipation of Basel II.33
Fifth, we provide formal statistical tests of differences in trends in the
levels of the Trade-credit export share. In cross-sectional regressions, the
coefficient estimates for Basel II interactions are statistically significant: There
are nonparallel trends in the pre-Basel II data between the treated and control
groups (see the odd-numbered columns of the Internet Appendix Table A6).
However, Basel II interactions are not statistically significant when we run
the same regressions with double-differenced pre-Basel II data (see the even-
numbered columns of the Internet Appendix Table A6), justifying our use of
Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei (2013) approach.
Sixth, we check whether the statistical significance of our results depends
on the clustering of the standard errors along the country-time dimension:
t-statistics based on five different clustering options presented in the
Internet Appendix Table A7 indicate that this is not the case.
Seventh, and finally, we examine the dispersion of counterparty bank ratings.
Figure 3 and the Internet Appendix Table A8 suggest that counterparty bank
ratings show very little variation: Our results are unlikely to be driven by shifts
or heterogeneity in bank ratings.
32 In fact, in the midpoint regression of the Internet Appendix Table A5, Column 1, under the assumption that
the letter of credits’ remaining maturities are longer than three months, we observe a statistically significant
coefficient estimate for 80% Risk-weight decrease × Basel II (as opposed to the comparable estimates of the
Internet Appendix Table A2, which are not statistically significant).
33 The placebo tests also suggest that the triple-difference regressions remove the differences in pre-Basel II time
trends between the treatment and control groups that we observe in the nondifferenced dependent variable.
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Figure 3
Changes in the means and standard deviations of OECD and non-OECD bank ratings
Figure 3A plots the changes in the (total assets weighted) mean of individual bank ratings per OECD country
(y-axis) against the changes in the associated standard deviation (x-axis). Figure 3B plots the same variables for
the non-OECD member countries. Agency bank ratings, which are from Bankscope database, have been assigned
numerical values as follows: one to the rating of Aaa by Moody’s or AAA by S&P and Fitch, two to Aa1 or
AA+, three to Aa2 or AA, etc. The country-level bank-total asset-weighted means and standard deviations are
calculated over two annual periods t =1 (July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012) and t =2 (July 1, 2012 through June
30, 2013). Changes are calculated between these two annual periods for each country.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we provide the first direct test of the trade-finance channel of
international trade (i.e., exports) that works through letters of credit, while we
control for the more general bank lending channel. Our findings indicate that
changes in risk-based capital standards that affect costs of holding letters of
credit impact export patterns at the firm-country-product level.
In the Turkish case that we study, all banks had to apply risk weights as a
function of the agency rating of the counterparty bank after the uniform adoption
of the standardized approach of Basel II in mid-2012. These changes generate
two sets of identification schemes in which the shocks move in opposite
directions for the Turkish exports to the OECD- and non-OECD-member
countries. We estimate difference-in-differences regressions that implicitly take
into account firm-country-product-level confounding factors.
We find that even though the letters-of-credit-based export shares are affected
by Basel II’s adoption in Turkey, the total exports are not. This suggests that the
effect of higher risk-based capital requirements on exports is subtler than the
one anticipated in the popular press and by international trade organizations.34
In fact, our results indicate that, in the particular case of letters of credit financed
exports, the shocks to the trade-finance channel appear to play a less important
role in determining the export flows. This points to the relevance of the more
34 In a similar vein, Fraisse, Lé, and Thesmar (2015) find that the 2008 adoption of Basel II in France had subtler
effects than expected. Under Basel II aggregate firm borrowing and investment increased in France, allowing
the preservation of jobs during a crisis period as average bank capital required for industrial loans decreased by
2%, on average.
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general bank credit channel that was picked up inter alia by Paravisini et al.
(2015) or Del Prete and Federico (2014).
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